Socrates' argument that virtue cannot be taught In the second half of Plato's Meno, Socrates doubts that virtue is a type of teachable knowledge and instead argues that it is a result of “true opinion” (97b). Reading Socrates' argument, I find that, although his doubt that virtue is teachable knowledge is justified, the evidence he uses is flawed. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay After Meno insists that Socrates address the initial question Meno asked him, namely: "whether...virtue is something that can be taught, or is it a natural gift, or of whatever way it reaches men” (86d). Socrates begins by positing the first presupposition, “if virtue is a kind of knowledge, it is clear that it could be taught” (87c). This brings us to a new question: “knowledge of virtue or something else” (87c)? Meno and Socrates then agree that “virtue is itself something good” (87d). Therefore, if there is “something else good that is different and separate from knowledge, virtue may well not be a kind of knowledge; but if there is nothing good that knowledge does not include, we would have reason to suspect that it is a kind of knowledge” (87d). They both find that virtue makes people good and that if people are good, they are beneficial “for all that.” what is good is beneficial” (87th). Virtue is therefore something beneficial since virtue is good. Socrates then examines other things beneficial to people, such as health, strength, and beauty. (87th). He emphasizes “that these same things also sometimes harm” (88a). Whether or not a good or quality of the soul is used correctly determines whether or not it harms a person (88a). For example, if someone is courageous without wisdom, his carelessness will harm him. If they are courageous and wise, they benefit. The same dynamic, of benefit when a good is used wisely and harm when a good is used in ignorance, applies to other things such as moderation and mental quickness (88b). Therefore, “whatever the soul undertakes and endures, if directed by wisdom, results in happiness, but if directed by ignorance, it results in the opposite” (88c). It would therefore seem that since the qualities of the soul, such as courage and moderation, are "in themselves neither beneficial nor harmful" while virtue is beneficial, it follows that virtue "must be a kind of wisdom”, since wisdom helps to direct the soul. beneficial qualities of the soul (88d). It would seem then that if virtue is a kind of wisdom, then virtue must be a kind of knowledge (88c). Furthermore, good people are not good by nature but rather by learning since virtue appears as a kind of knowledge and if it is knowledge, it can be taught. (89c) Socrates challenges the conclusion drawn that virtue is teachable knowledge by saying: "I am not saying that it is wrong to say that virtue is teachable if it is knowledge, but see if it is reasonable to my part to doubt that it is. knowledge” (89d). He maintains the initial presupposition that knowledge can be taught and instead disputes that virtue is a kind of knowledge. The first argument he makes against virtue as knowledge is the fact that he "often tried to find out if there were teachers of [virtue], but despite all [his] efforts, [he] could not find any." found] none” (89th). ). Socrates points out that if.