In this article, I intend to argue against Moore's beliefs about moral intuition. I will show that while there is something that is moral intuition, it is not a set of standards that can be directly applied to every person. I will show how there are differences in scenarios and situations that need to be taken into account before arguing using moral intuition. The first argument I will address is that of cultural relativism. It is widely accepted that different cultures, whether just regional or global, have different ways of looking at life. While one culture may find something socially acceptable, another may find the same thing completely taboo. To begin this argument, I would like to cite the work of Richmond Campbell in “Moral Epistemology” (Campbell 2003). “Moral knowledge exists, but moral facts are relative to the social group in which moral sensitivity is formed, so that no moral truth is universally known. » While it may be right to judge someone from your own culture based on your moral intuition, the above statement shows that you cannot also transfer that moral judgment to another culture. Campbell uses the argument of a woman wearing a veil over her face. He says that while in one culture this may be morally wrong, in another there is nothing wrong with it. (Campbell 2003.) To the average American, this seems morally wrong. By doing this you are shaming a woman or hiding her from the world. But you have to look at this through the context of culture. In the countries where this ideology originated, there is nothing wrong with a woman covering the majority of her body. In these cultures, women tend to be much more fashionable... middle of paper ......n (Alexander.) Following the logic above, you can understand, oddly enough, that following moral intuitions is in fact morally wrong. . I say this because relying on moral intuition alone runs counter to both beneficence and self-enhancement when it comes to prima facie duties. Works Cited Campbell, R. (2003, February 4). Moral epistemology. Stanford University. Accessed May 1, 2014, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-epistemology/Intuitionism. (nd). Intuitionism. Retrieved May 2, 2014, from http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SzCMT/intuit.htmlAlexander, J. and Weinberg, J. (January 1, 2009). The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions. . Accessed May 2, 2014, from http://www.siena.edu/uploadedfiles/home/academics/schools_and_departments/school_of_liberal_arts/philosophy/Alexander%20&%20Weinberg.The%20Unreliability%20of%20Epistemic%20Intuitions.pdf