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Essay / The peacebuilding process
After the end of the Cold War, achieving lasting peace in post-conflict regions has become a top priority for the international community. The increase in internal conflicts around the world has caused enormous loss of life and threatened regional and global stability. Concerns over the high percentage of civilian casualties, refugee movements, and fallout from these regional frictions have launched a new era of interventionism in international relations. Efforts to prevent recurrent violence and create conditions for lasting peace in post-conflict regions have come to be known as peacebuilding. However, building lasting peace in war-torn societies has proven a difficult task and many peacebuilding operations led by global actors such as the United Nations (UN) have failed to produce the expected results. The main debates relating to peacebuilding have evolved around the liberal democratic model, its invasive nature and the shortcomings of its implementation. As Chandler argues, the two major flaws in peacebuilding are the biased conceptualization of liberal peace and the flawed implementation of the liberal peacebuilding process. The following essay argues that these limitations are indeed true and that the liberal peace model is very invasive. This argument will be advanced using empirical evidence from the Cambodia intervention and major academic debates on liberal peacebuilding. Cambodia is the first occasion where the UN has formally taken over the administration of an independent country to create lasting peace and thus provides a unique case study for exploring issues related to peacebuilding. The analysis will first briefly define the term, explaining the liberal approach and the different gradations. He will then present the main criticisms and limitations of the process, then discuss the case study. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why violent video games should not be banned”? Get an original essay The term “peacebuilding” was first coined by Johan Galtung in his 1975 work “Three Approaches to Peacebuilding”. peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding" in which he argued that "peace has a structure different from, perhaps beyond, peacekeeping and peacemaking ad hoc... The mechanisms on which peace is based should be integrated into the structure and be present as a reservoir allowing the system itself to develop... More precisely, it is necessary to find structures that eliminate the causes of wars and provide alternatives to war in situations where wars might arise." The United Nations describes "peacebuilding" in a similar way, defining it as an intervention that involves a series of measures aimed at reducing the risk of relapse into conflict by strengthening national capacity at all levels for conflict management and laying the foundations for lasting peace. and development. In the aftermath of the Cold War and due to the dominance of Western ideology, the most widely accepted way of conducting the peacebuilding process became the liberal peace framework. This framework combines the establishment of democracy, development, the rule of law and the free market (Mandelbaum, 2002: 6; Duffield, 2001: 11; Paris, 2004). because it suggests that states have a greater incentive to cooperate with other states due to economic ties and interdependence. The establishment of democracy isalso become vital due to the democratic peace argument which classifies democracies as more peaceful and law-abiding than other political systems. The main goals are a self-sustaining peace in which violence is avoided by conforming to international and Western models of governance. The above liberal assumptions are consistent with most policy documents relating to peace and security (United Nations, 2004). Liberal peace has been favored in post-conflict peacebuilding due to the assumption of its unproblematic structure, universal applicability and its origins can be traced in four main international theories, namely "peace of the victors”, “constitutional peace”, “institutional peace” and “civil peace”. “Winner's peace” stems from the traditional realist theory of peace which depends on the military superiority of the victor and enables his hegemony in international relations leading to lasting stability and peace. The second theory of "constitutional peace" was directly influenced by the philosopher Immanuel Kant and his liberal argument that peace arises from democracy, free trade, and the internationally accepted notion that humans are ends in themselves rather than means to an end (Doyle, 1983). The third theory, known as "institutional peace", evolved from the romanticized liberal-internationalist and liberal-institutionalist assumption that states are able to agree multilaterally on how to behave and on how to enforce or establish this behavior. The final theory, that of "civil peace", is based on the phenomenon of direct citizen action and advocacy for the establishment or protection of fundamental values and principles of human rights, extending from the abolition of slavery to the active participation of civil society in international affairs. relations today (Halliday, 2001) Liberal peacebuilding has adopted various approaches to operations depending on the needs of each state, the capacities of the actors and the interests of the different donors involved. Traditional peacebuilding involves top-down approaches to development and foreign administration of political, military or economic domains in the post-conflict region. This peacebuilding model has been widely criticized as a form of foreign hegemony due to its minimal initiatives for local involvement. The conditions attached to economic aid/loans and the use of force by the actors involved have been condemned as coercive and addictive. In order to overcome these limitations, liberal operations involve more and more local actors in the process. This approach is known as the “local turn in peacebuilding” and involves local ownership initiatives and close cooperation between local elites and foreign actors in established liberal administration and institutions. Although this model follows a more bottom-up approach and integrates more local cultures, it still seeks to achieve a linear application and transmission of Western goals and norms in newly constructed institutions. Such an example would be the failure of the peace and reconciliation process carried out during the intervention in Sierra Leone. (elaborate) The peacebuilding intervention in Cambodia constitutes a unique case study that illustrates the main limitations of liberal peacebuilding. For the first time in history, the UN took chargethe administration of an independent country in such a large-scale state-building effort. The United Nations Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) promised a “comprehensive peace” settlement (Doyle, 1995: 13). His mandate focused on achieving democratic elections between the four opposing factions (the Cambodian People's Party, the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF and the FUNINPEC party) and establishing a legitimate representative government. Other goals included drafting a new constitution, controlling the administrative apparatus, disarmament and ceasefire in post-conflict regions, maintaining human rights and resettling refugees. . What the international community hoped was that if transparent and democratic elections were held, it would result in a power-sharing system and thus help ease the power struggle and political conflict. Furthermore, the establishment of a liberal economy and liberal institutions would contribute to stability and lay the foundations for lasting peace. This handed UNTAC a mammoth state-building task. The intervention initiated in 1992 can be characterized as a traditional liberal peacebuilding operation, as described above, due to the centralized and foreign-led administration, minimal local involvement and the transmission of Western conceptions of good governance and democratic values. Some NGOs and other independent actors have engaged in more local approaches, but the majority of interventions have been administered by purely external forces. UNTAC's mission was a form of social restructuring and state building, based on liberal principles and the belief that the only way to achieve lasting peace was through democratization. This pioneering attempt was to achieve its ambitious goals in a short period of time. The new government would be powerful, representative and capable of regulating the Cambodian population without resorting to arms or violence. Furthermore, human and political rights would be protected by the state and liberal economics and capitalist practices would guarantee economic freedom and the empowerment of civil society. The funding and work of NGOs and other independent actors would further strengthen the local population and provide initiatives for the creation of pressure groups and other representative interest groups. Indeed, the peacebuilding intervention produced positive results for Cambodia. NGOs have become an indispensable part of local society since their introduction in 1992. They have helped empower civil society through their monetary assistance and contributed to the overall functioning of the liberal peace. In fact, figures presented by Pact (2005) show more than four hundred NGOs active in Cambodia. The holding of the 1992 elections can also be considered a success since more than ninety percent of Cambodians voted to elect a new government. Refugee resettlement has also produced astonishing results, with the repatriation of almost 400,000 people (Doyle, 1995: 371). The armed conflicts were over and the UNTAC mission was able to withdraw after achieving its short-term objectives, giving credibility to Western methods and the liberal concept of peace. With the departure of UNTAC, there remained room for other actors to take over. tasks previously performed by the UN administration. A plethora of peacebuilding actors have emerged to pursue organizational tasks and ensure the continuation ofliberal peace. International financial institutions such as the IMF, NGO groups and other international actors became increasingly involved and between 1992 and 2001, more than $4 billion was provided to Cambodia in financing (Peou , 2005: 112). Loans intended to stimulate the economy were provided by these international actors and Cambodia experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 4.6 percent until 200 (Sok, Acharya, 2002: 14-15). However, beyond these significant successes, the peacebuilding exercise can only be evaluated by evaluating its main objectives: achieving lasting peace, good governance, effective democratization, the rule of law, the maintenance of human rights and a strong civil society. be a difficult task for the UNTAC administration. Although they formally succeeded in carrying out the 1992 elections, this was not enough to prove that a consolidation of the democratic process had been established. The 1992 elections and subsequent elections in 1998 and 2003 did not result in a true representation of the will of the population. They acted only as a superficial remedy and did not cure the dictatorial elements deeply rooted in the indigenous political tradition. Hun Sen's political party, through facade representative elections, used the infrastructure provided to achieve a monopoly of power and credibility. 11This event did not resonate with the Khmer Rouge party, which voluntarily distanced itself from the peace process by accusing the National Council of Cambodia of harboring abuses of power and lacking legitimate representation. Indeed, even though official election results placed King Sihanouk at the top of Cambodia's administration, Hun Sen continued to influence political direction and, by 1997, possessed enough power to lead a coup d'état. In the following elections, and in fear of being defeated, he managed to destroy the two most powerful opposition parties, namely the Sam Rainsy Party and FUNCINPEC, in order to once again deceive the system. Dissatisfaction with the dysfunction of the democratic system was apparent in Sam Rainsy's statement: As a false democracy, Cambodia is a country with only a democratic facade consisting of seemingly democratic institutions, which in fact operate in the most autocratic manner (Phnom Penh Post, 2005). These instabilities in the democratization process can be attributed to the unique character of Cambodia's traditional political system in which power and violence often converge. International actors often fail to adopt or build on the existing political or economic practices of local populations during the peacebuilding process. As in the case of Cambodia, indigenous structures were dismissed as completely dysfunctional, even though some of them were indeed adapted to local needs. Foreign models of governance and institutions were therefore favored and liberal peace practices were deemed a necessary remedy. Foreign actors viewed the indigenous political and economic landscape as a complete blank slate, ready to adopt their own ideas of governance in order to achieve lasting peace. This oversimplification and disregard for local dynamics has undermined the effectiveness of UNTAC's mission. The Cambodian conflict was essentially a competition between the four warring parties for a monopoly on political power, military and economic resources. The recommended liberal model of governance allowed just that, provided that the democratically elected government wasimpartial in nature, without aspirations to exploit power. As Roberts (2001: 32) argues, elections “simply changed the means of communicating hostility and confrontation, from war to elections.” The struggle for power was not stopped, but rather facilitated by the creation of foreign institutions. These abuses of power and the apparent failures of democratic institutions led to the conclusion that strong international involvement was still necessary after UNTAC's departure. International donors, NGOs and other agencies filled the space left by the UN-led administration and acted as a support mechanism to maintain the imposed liberal model. Frustration with government inefficiency and the epidemic of corruption are leading donors to direct funding to NGOs rather than state authorities. This again limited the state's ability to manage its own affairs without further intervention. Limited indigenous participation further compounds the problem as the government is deprived of the knowledge and expertise needed to carry out its tasks independently in the future. Corruption and weak local administration led the IMF and World Bank to impose conditions on their monetary loans. (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003). This strategy often results in a further loss of the state's authority to direct its own economy since the loans come with predetermined economic policies. When it comes to the rule of law in post-intervention Cambodian society, the problem of corruption is once again present. The country's hierarchical social and political infrastructure allows for deception at all levels of daily life in Cambodia. A study by the Center for Social Development found that even after intervention, corrupt practices extended from public services to educational and judicial institutions (Nissen, 2005). The monopoly of power, favored by democratization, allowed the development of hierarchical networks and clientelism. These corrupt practices are of course observed in Western countries. They are also inevitable bugs of liberalism, but their development in resource-scarce environments makes the problem even more serious. Clientelism and cronyism were therefore not favored by intervention but rather encouraged by the monopoly of power. Human rights have also had somewhat problematic application in Cambodian society. Although UNTAC's mandate was centered on the promotion of human rights, figures show that these have failed to take root in this post-conflict environment. The reports highlight serious political and human rights deficiencies in the country. According to CSD research, the judiciary ranks among the worst and “most dishonest” institutions, followed by law enforcement and customs. (Nissen, 2005: 101). These problems triggered further interventionism from the UN, which in 2006-2010 launched a development assistance framework for Cambodia. The free-standing promise of the liberal peace initiative therefore failed to ensure the promotion of human rights without the need for foreign aid or supervision. The difficulty of preserving human rights is a common phenomenon in international intervention efforts. Despite the dysfunctional infrastructure and/or corruption that prevents their promotion, human rights as conceived by the West do not always correspond to what the local population envisions. There is a common misconception regarding the universal applicability or..