Searle's article, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” was originally published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 1980. It became one of the articles in modern philosophy (and more broadly in cognitive science) the most controversial and discussed articles due to the nature of the argument presented in the document. In said article, John Searle sought, or should I say seeks, to challenge the claim that artificial intelligence in the form of computers and programs could, or at the most basic level, (one day) , think for itself synthetic; it is essentially a refutation of the idea that computers or programs can actually “understand” in the same way that a human can. This argument is framed around two distinct claims: (1) Intentionality in humans is a product of causal features of the brain, that is, the mind is a product of the brain. (2) The instantiation of a computer program is never in itself a sufficient condition of intentionality, that is to say, the simple fact that a computer or a program has the necessary resources to understand does not mean not that the computer or program can actually understand. Before examining these claims further, it is important to illustrate exactly what type of artificial intelligence Searle is addressing. There are two different types of AI, one being “weak AI” and the other being “strong AI”. The layman's understanding of weak AI, or "careful AI" as some call it, is that the computer or program is simply used as a tool, something that can facilitate the human mind in a more powerful way. This essentially boils down weak AI to a resource for simulating mental abilities - useful for people working in psychology or medicine where processes like hypothesis testing are important, which a computer can do better simulate a human. It is important to...... middle of paper ...... robot that fulfills its various motor functions. Yet, Searle argues, the user still understands nothing beyond the manipulation of symbols. Execution of the program prevents the occurrence of any mental state of any significant type. Searle also argues in this case that there is a tacit concession to the argument for strong AI: the robot's response suggests that cognition and understanding in computers is not just a matter of symbol manipulation; contrary to what strong AI actually entails. The tacit concession is the result of adding a set of causal relations with the external world (http://www.iep.utm.edu/chineser/#SH2b).http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/turing+ test?s=ts p. 417 Minds, brains and programs. Searle, John. http://psych.utoronto.ca/users/reingold/courses/ai/turing.html http://www.iep.utm.edu/chineser/http://www.iep.utm.edu/chineser/# SH2b