The internal causes attributed to the absence or absence of PLS ​​financing modes are the factors found within an Islamic financial institution. Although many reasons have been cited including lack of human resources and management problems, it is evident that recurring information asymmetry would be identified as the optimal cause for which Islamic banks refrain from using profit and loss sharing contracts as a means. finances. The problem of information asymmetry occurs when one party to a transaction is unaware of vital information, which could lead to the second party taking advantage of the former party's lack of knowledge. Thus, the presence of such asymmetry leads to three usual negative factors, namely: adverse selection, moral hazards and agency costs. These will be explained in more detail below. Adverse selection: Like any other financial institution, Islamic banks are obliged to take into account the issue of risk management. It is therefore imperative in this debate to address the issue of the agency or contract enforcement problem within Islamic finance; one of the most discussed risks facing Islamic banks today. Due to an apparent “low level of transparency”, it is argued that PLS contracts are inherently vulnerable to agency problems such as those of contractors. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that Islamic banks, as investors, fear that borrowers are withholding crucial information in some cases. Lacking comprehensive information on borrowers, banks are unable to discriminate against risky borrowers. This is commonly called information asymmetry. In conventional banking, lenders charge high interest rates to negate the higher inherent risk of lending. However, due to a lack...... middle of article ......CityBrouwer, M. 2005. Managing uncertainty through profit-sharing contracts from medieval Italy to Silicon Valley. Journal of Management & Governance, 9 (3-4), pp. 237--255. Dar, HA and Presley, JR 2000. Lack of profit loss sharing in Islamic banking: management and control imbalances. international journal of islamic financial services, 2 (2), pp. 3--18. Dar, H., Harvey, D. and Presley, J. 2014. Size, profitability and agency in profit and loss sharing in Islamic countries. Banking and Finance. [report] Cambridge, Massachusetts: Proceedings of the Second Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance. Febianto, I. 2012. Adapting Risk Management for Profit and Loss Sharing Financing of Islamic Banks. Modern Economy, 3 (1). Ul Haque, N. and Mirakhor, A. 1986. Optimal profit-sharing contracts and investment in an interest-free Islamic economy. IMF Working Paper.