Why couldn't Kant be a utilitarian? SUMMARY: In his essay “Could Kant have been a utilitarian?” ", RM Hare attempts to show that Kant's moral theory contains utilitarian elements and one can rightly ask whether Kant could have been a utilitarian, even if he was not. I take Hare's challenge to the standard view seriously because I find his reading overall reasonable enough to lead to a coherent interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. However, I find it difficult to conclude that one can necessarily conclude from Hare's reading that Kant could have been a utilitarian. In this article, I will first show that Hare's interpretation that "treating a person as an end", that is, treating a person's ends as our own, is reasonable, as is his reading of “desiring our maxim as a universal law” and the “duties of oneself”, which is based on this interpretation. Next, I will argue that Kant could not be a utilitarian despite the seemingly utilitarian elements of his theory, because caring about the ends of others (of which happiness is the sum) is a duty. This is so, according to Kant, not because happiness has value in itself, but because it is the sum of those ends freely set by each rational human being which has value in itself, it is i.e. an end in itself. In his essay "Could Kant have been a utilitarian?", (1) RM Hare, analyzing Kant's text, attempts to show that Kant's moral theory contains utilitarian elements and one can rightly ask whether Kant could have been a utilitarian when in fact he was not. I take his challenge to the standard view seriously, not because it is formulated by the famous moral philosopher, but because I find it reading. what Hare makes of Kant's text as a whole sufficiently reasonable to lead to a coherent interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. of paper ...... fuer Philosophie), 1991.(3) T. Terada, op.cit. ; the philosophy of Kant. Practical Philosophy", in: Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress, 1995. (6) T. Terada, "Kanto ni okeru Jiko ni taisuru Gimu no Mondai (The problem of “duties towards oneself” in Kant)”, Tetsugaku (The Philosophy) 46, 1995; T. Nitta, “Fuhenkakanosei to Sogo-shutaisei (Universal-izability and Intersubjectivity)”, in: Aichi Kenritsu Daigaku ronshu 35, 1986.(7) T. Terada, ““The universal principle of law” as the supreme principle of practice practice of Kant. Philosophy"; P. Guyer, “Kant's Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom”, in Dancy (ed.), op.cit.(8) WK Frankena, Ethics, Prentice-Hall, 1973.