For Aristotle, the doctrine of average is a moral frame of reference by which the character of each man can be better understood. Applied to specific virtues such as courage, it illuminates what Aristotle sees as the complex relationship between the agent of virtue, his judgment, and his character. However, the value of the theory of the mean lies in its recognition of man's moral autonomy, an independence made necessary by the incomplete and inconclusive nature of Aristotle's doctrine. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Aristotle's account of virtue in the Ethics is structured by its organizing principle, the doctrine of the mean. He first develops virtue as a means through the analogy of art. He writes: “A master of all art avoids excesses and defects, but seeks the intermediary and chooses this intermediary, not in the object but in relation to us” (1106b5). So the standard by which every art does its work well and by which the good artist is judged is by looking to the intermediary. For Aristotle, virtue is “more exact and better than any art”. Thus, as an art, virtue must also have the quality of aiming at the intermediary (1106b10). He states that what is at issue here is moral virtue, the body of virtue that encompasses the passions and actions and their inherent excesses, deficiencies, and intermediaries. What is this intermediary at which the master artist of the good life aims? Aristotle writes that what is intermediate is feeling the right pleasures and pains at the right time, with the right motive and in the right way; regarding actions (1106b20). Thus, we find that there are four components of mean within each means of virtue itself: mean with respect to emotions, pleasures and pains, attitude and intention, and mean action both in excess and deficiency. Of these components of average are forms of failure, but the intermediate is a form of success toward which virtue aims. Ultimately, Aristotle concludes that it is possible to fail in many ways, but to succeed is only possible in one way. summarizes this explanation of virtue as a means and introduces the secondary element of choice in 1107a: Virtue is therefore a state of character concerned with choice, situated in a means. . . in relation to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Furthermore, virtue is a golden mean between two vices, one which falls short and the other which exceeds what is right in passions and actions. How does the doctrine of average develop for the specific virtue of courage? Aristotle begins by characterizing courage as a means through a rating starting at 3.6, using the elements of fear and confidence as measuring criteria. He first asks: What are men afraid of? Because he defines fear as the expectation of evil, he concludes that the things one fears are terrible things, evils such as disgrace, poverty, and disease (1115a10). Yet there is a distinction between men when it comes to fear. The courageous man fears only what it is just and noble to fear, and he would be ignoble if he did not fear them. The courageous man fears the greatest thing, death, in the noblest circumstances of danger: he is courageous who is not afraid in the face of a noble death (1115a30). Not all terrible things are terrible in the same magnitude and degree; some are terrible beyond human strength. Although the courageous man fears even the things that arethe scope of human forces, he will confront them as he must and as the rule prescribes, for the love of honor; for this is the end of virtue (1115a30). Not only are the objects of fear characterized by variations, but fear, as an emotion, is also subject to degrees and variations: one can fear more or less. The courageous man faces and fears the right things and for the right motive, in the right way and at the right time. He feels and acts according to the merits of each case, according to the rule, thus "achieving the golden mean in action, emotion and intention" with the aim or aim of conforming to the state of courageous character . Because courage is noble and everything is defined by its end, the end of courage is noble. Thus, the courageous man endures and acts according to the guidelines of courage for a noble end (1115b20). Aristotle analyzes the state of courage and its opposing states through a dissection of the magnitudes of fear and confidence. Aristotle calls the one who exceeds in intrepidity insensible, and the one who exceeds in confidence is reckless (1115b25). The reckless man is a pretender and imitator of courage: as the courageous man is towards the terrible, so the reckless man wants to appear (1115b30). In his analysis, Aristotle straddles the genres of recklessness and cowardice by asserting that the reckless man acts in both directions: by nature reckless, the reckless man does not persevere against what is truly terrible, showing himself equally coward. It therefore seems that the reckless man deviates from the average courage in both directions, although he is characterized above all by his excess of confidence. Conversely, the coward is overflowing with fear, fearing both what he should and what he should not, and lacks confidence. In summary: The coward, the reckless man and the courageous man therefore concern themselves with the same objects, but oppose them differently; for the first two exceed and miss, while the third holds the middle, which is the right position. (1116a5)For Aristotle, courage is the means to objects that inspire emotions of confidence or fear, choosing and enduring these objects because of the nobility or baseness of doing so. Fear and confidence play the configuring roles around which the narrative of courage revolves. They bring together the four components of the average (emotion, pleasure/pain, intention and action). Fear and confidence are the emotions which impel man to act and give to action the intention or attitude which accompanies it, and they arise from man's sensitivity to pleasure and pain. the pleasure of doing base deeds and the pain involved in doing noble deeds.” Aristotle writes, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and each passion and each action is accompanied by pleasures and pains, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains (1104b15). Yet, paradoxically, even if courage comes from facing what is. painful, it has a pleasant and noble ending which is masked by the circumstances which surround it. This is at the heart of the conflict in the courageous man: he must reconcile his feeling of fear (aversion to pain and desire for security) and the uncertainty that inhabits him. his feeling of confidence in the desire for the good which is the end. There is a conflict here between the external goal and the internal feelings attached to it. The courageous man assigns the right value to these dangers, goods and goals, and controls himself accordingly. Aristotle's theory of the mean makes two models possible for identifying the mean. The first consists of fixing the two extremes (state of excess and deficiency) in relation to each other, and consequently of fixing the optimal average in relation to these two points. The second model consists ofstarting from an independent optimum and identifying the two end directions. Regarding courage, Aristotle proposes and adopts the second approach by identifying the average based on man's feelings of fear and confidence. His methodology is centered on fear. Aristotle first takes the things that are feared by men and identifies those that should be rightly feared and those that should not be feared. The courageous man attains the means of courage by fearing what is to be feared, confronting it when necessary, and, furthermore, confronting what is not to be feared. Having found this means, Aristotle characterizes the insensitive, reckless and cowardly man by the magnitude and the rightness of his fears and by his actions by supporting or abstaining from the objects of his fear. The doctrine of the average, with its structural analysis of virtue and its opposition, raises the question of who will be able to identify the average. Is a fair judgment about good and evil a necessary prerequisite for identifying the average? Aristotle implies that this is the case. At 1143a20, he defines judgment as the right discrimination of the equitable. To be a man of good and just judgment is to be able to judge things that are practical wisdom (1143a30). Thus, right judgment reconciles understanding and discrimination of what is equitable with practical wisdom. The identification of a virtue, already defined as the means determined by the rational principle followed by a man of practical wisdom, requires a right judgment on the part of the agent concerning what is right and wrong (1107a). To support this position, Aristotle distinguishes states of character that he considers false types of courage. Among these is the courage of the citizen-soldier: because he is obliged to act as he does, he does not have his own judgment about what is noble. Nor is the passionate man truly courageous because he lacks the choice and motivation that comes from correct judgment: he is like a wild beast, acting not for honor but through the force of his passions. Finally, the ignorant person who acts courageously is excluded from true courage: he or she is devoid of conscience and autonomy, and is therefore devoid of right judgment. For Aristotle, judgment can be wrong, but a right judgment implies that one has judged good and evil correctly, and to the extent that the virtue of courage has as its end what is noble and just, the right judgment is prior to the identification of the mean. The point to consider in conclusion is whether identification of the mean is necessarily followed by virtuous action. Do human beings sometimes err in acting virtuously, even if they have knowledge of the virtuous and average state? Plato states that if good is known, men will choose that good, because no one voluntarily chooses what is harmful. Aristotle echoes this position by asserting that every action . . . aim at property (1094a). Although action is linked to intention and emotion, each of them has a distinct and independent existence. By extension, is right judgment separate from choice? For Aristotle, virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, situated in a happy medium (1107a). He asserts that right judgment cannot be separated from the choice manifested in correct and virtuous character, that which is chosen as its medium. Therefore, good judgment is a necessary condition for the agent's identification of the mean. Keep in mind: this is just a sample. Get a personalized article from our expert writers now. Get a Custom Essay Aristotle's doctrine of the average provides a moral framework that is not based on morality, but rather on the elements30).