In the excerpt from Mancur Olson's classic work “The Logic of Collective Action,” in the Kernell/Smith Reader, l The author explores the levels of difficulty posed in coordinating collective action to achieve common goals. Furthermore, since politics is the process by which individuals and groups enter into collective agreements and take collective action, collectivity underpins political decision-making and action through cooperation. The main obstacle is the free-rider problem which arises from the inherent weakness of group dynamics. In any unit, one person or minority actively participates, contributes and supports the existence of the group. However, all members benefit. Although they share common interests, free riders hinder common action. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essay The following problem is due to the scale or size of the group. Olson argues that, regardless, universal participation continues to limit common action, because differences of opinion and divergent interests only lead to cacophony. Accordingly, disunity is defined by the inability to reach consensus. Indeed, this conflictual climate hinders collective decision-making and cooperative efforts. On the other hand, unanimity can also impose an overwhelming burden on a country's or organization's resources, as evidenced by the nationalization of public policy in the United States. Olson highlights the final problem, the nature of the issues involved for the commons within the collective. Common goods or public goods refer to the production of most municipalities and government corporations. Some common goods to consider are water, sunlight, air, education, property, and government services. Naturally, the common interest is defined as the unifying concerns that unite the group. There is no stake or direct interest in the commons or public goods. True common goods are non-rivalrous (the use of one good or service does not compromise the supply of another) and non-excludable (one cannot prevent another from using or enjoy it). As a result, the lack of specific incentives and the assumption of universal benefit for the commons hinder action. Overall, deducing from the arguments above, Olson argues for collective action and the political power of the few, overturning previous political thinking about the tyranny of the majority. His observations are based on the real threat posed by a powerful minority involved in politics. Unlike gigantic cooperatives, small groups benefit from their ability to agree, partner, mobilize and execute quickly. The result is that powerful minorities often dominate in negotiation processes and even overtake larger representative bodies. Olson launches into a gripping analysis of a case study in which, ironically, not-so-common interests materialize. Monopolies with disproportionate ownership and fewer stakeholders compete more effectively and advance more quickly as politicians become more sympathetic to private lobbies. Olson's unconventional findings run counter to the popular belief that in a democracy the will of the majority overwhelms the minority. Ultimately, the scales, issues, sympathies, key concerns and.