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Essay / The construction of the concept of virtue
Aristotle devotes the first six books of his Nicomachean Ethics to a discussion of virtue. In doing so, he divides virtue into two different categories: moral virtue and intellectual virtue and discusses them individually. However, in our approach to the question of the highest moral virtue, we will examine moral virtue and intellectual virtue together (rather than separately) with the aim of not only discerning what Aristotle considers that virtue to be, but also of to examine whether or not there is a virtue. a connection between the two different types of virtue. Although Aristotle gives the moral virtues extreme importance, we will find that even the highest moral virtues could not exist without the intellectual virtues. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essayAccording to Aristotle, intellectual virtues develop through teaching and instruction, while moral virtues develop through practice or force of habit. Moral virtues are not naturally instilled in us; the soul is designed to receive moral virtues, but to become guiding forces they must be nourished by habit. The soul acquires moral virtue by exercising it, just as the harpist learns to play the harp by playing it and men become builders by building houses (1103a14-1103b2). Morally virtuous character is not created by thought, but rather by action. According to Aristotle, the next thing we need to understand about virtue is the concept of moderation. He first notes that the nature of moral qualities is destroyed by both defect and excess (1104a12-13). As an example, Aristotle notes that too much or too little food and drink will destroy our health, while the proportional amount will increase and preserve it. Applying these doctrines to virtue, Aristotle notes that the man who avoids everything becomes a coward while he who does not know fear becomes reckless. In all things, virtue represents a middle ground between too much and too little (1104a15-27). Aristotle ends the second book with a warning about referring to the virtuous means as being the opposite of one of the extremes rather than the middle ground between them. . If we were to take some examples from Book III, we might be inclined to say that courage is the opposite of cowardice and that temperance is the opposite of licentiousness. This, according to Aristotle, is an incorrect statement, as shown in the diagram below: Recklessness ------- Courage ------- CowardiceBy drawing a line diagram such as the one we see above, it is actually recklessness, rather than courage which is the opposite of cowardice. Rather, courage is the golden mean or virtue between the two vices. Although we may be inclined to argue otherwise, virtue in all things is that which seeks the golden mean. The next thing we need to understand about virtue comes from book three, which deals with what Aristotle calls voluntary and involuntary actions. All morally virtuous conduct is rooted in voluntary action. Aristotle writes that an involuntary action is one performed under compulsion or ignorance, while a voluntary action is one in which the initiative belongs to the agent who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed (1111a21 -4). An act is completely involuntary only when its sole cause is not the person performing it, but an external force or person (for example, a person pushes you from behind towards another person) (1110a1-5) . Other forms of involuntary action areacts performed out of ignorance (when the person is unaware of the particular situation) or in ignorance (when an action is performed due to drunkenness or immorality) (1110b15-35). Voluntary action, on the other hand, involves a choice. Aristotle carefully distinguishes choice from opinion and argues that true choice implies that the person choosing can determine that action is preferable to another (1112a2-15). Therefore, the concept of choice also involves deliberation when we are placed in a situation where the most preferable action is unclear. According to Aristotle, we never deliberate about ends, but rather take ends for granted and deliberate about how to achieve the best ends (1112b32-35). Because the object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same for Aristotle (1113a3), and because we can only deliberate between the options that are within our power (1112a32), a choice must be considered as a revision of the things that are in our power (1112a32). 1113a10-14).In choosing, those of good morality will always aim for the good. However, those who do not have good morals may misunderstand things and only wish for what they believe to be good. Good and vice are therefore within human power, and it is very possible that people voluntarily choose vice. If one were to deny this, one would also have to deny that man is the source of his own actions (1113b8-21). Aristotle supports this explanation by examining how legislators reward those who act nobly and punish those who do evil (except evil that is done under some duress or due to ignorance that is not their fault) . Just as people are responsible for their own bad actions, they are also responsible for their moral state. If someone falls into a bad moral condition, it is his own fault for living a bad life (1113b21-9). Knowing Aristotle's requirements for achieving moral virtue is extremely important because they directly impact the relationship between moral virtue and intellectual virtue. The relationship between moral virtue and intellectual virtue is discussed at length in book six. He begins the sixth book by returning to his fundamental premise that virtue is distinguished from vice by voluntary action that involves a certain level of reasoning. Reasoning occurs through deliberation and choice, as described above. There are five intellectual virtues according to Aristotle: science, art, practical wisdom, intellect and theoretical wisdom. Of these five virtues, he pays the greatest attention to practical wisdom. He argues that practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue of the same part of the soul that forms opinions and that unlike art (which is concerned with production and results in an object distinct from the process of making), wisdom practice concerns the domain of action where doing good is in itself an end. Therefore, practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue that enables one to grasp the truth about human action. The mark of a prudent person is that he deliberates well not only about what is good and advantageous in a particular situation, but also about what is conductive. to the good life in general (1140a25-28). He who deliberates well, according to Aristotle, deliberates correctly, and this correctness restricts deliberation to activities which allow a good to be achieved (1142b8-22). Earlier, we noted that Aristotle established this type of correct deliberation as a prerequisite for achieving moral virtue. It therefore logically follows that for a person to be truly good, they must be able to deliberate well and therefore have practical wisdom. However, a problem would arisenecessarily if a wicked man used practical wisdom and the power of deliberation to achieve something evil. Aristotle responds to this objection by citing a difference between practical wisdom and what he calls deceit. Practical wisdom and mischief are the power to take the steps that lead us to a goal we have set for ourselves. The crucial difference is that practical wisdom involves some view of the good as it appears to the virtuous person, whereas deceitfulness does not necessarily result in a good end (1144a29-37). Based on Aristotle's definition of what would be necessary to achieve moral virtue. , it would seem that one cannot achieve moral virtue if one does not first possess the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Moral virtue is learned through the voluntary performance of morally virtuous activities, and for an action to be voluntary, it necessarily involves deliberation. However, Aristotle's arguments about practical wisdom seem to suggest that the imprudent man would be incapable of such deliberation, because deliberative excellence is the mark of practical wisdom. Therefore, one would have to teach the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom before one could practice any of the moral virtues. On the other hand, the only difference between "practical wisdom" and "deceitfulness" lies in the goal each seeks to achieve. Practical wisdom involves deliberation toward goals considered “good,” while deceitfulness is deliberation toward goals considered “bad.” However, it would seem that a person needs a certain amount of moral virtue to distinguish which goal is “good” and “bad”. This forces us to conclude that practical wisdom requires moral virtue and we are left with a circular argument. Aristotle responds to this objection by showing that just as practical wisdom and dishonesty are similar, there is a similarity in what he calls "natural virtue." and “virtue in the full sense” (1144b3-4). He notes that from the moment we are born, we all tend to possess some level of virtue, but we tend to seek something in addition to what we were born with. The virtue we seek is what he calls “virtue in the full sense” and he argues that it is not possible to achieve this virtue without practical wisdom. Aristotle asserts that if we were to attempt to achieve moral virtue without practical wisdom, the action would be like "a mighty body which, moving without vision, suffers a mighty fall" (1144b10-20). Aristotle concludes book six by arguing that virtue in the full sense cannot be obtained without practical wisdom, and he argues that this definition has led some people to believe that all virtues are forms of practical wisdom. Most important in this reexamination of practical wisdom and moral virtue is his assertion that virtue is a characteristic guided by “good reason,” which is determined by practical wisdom (1144b16–24). However, Aristotle finds it necessary to go beyond this simple redefinition and goes on to assert that good reason in moral matters is practical wisdom. Therefore, good reason is what makes us virtuous and we can logically conclude that once we possess the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom alone, we will possess all moral virtues (1145a2-4). Now that we have a solid understanding of virtue, we can return to the question of moral virtue. Aristotle spends part of book three and all of book four describing the different moral virtues by applying his concept of the average. However, none of these virtues receive the same attention as.. 1980.