Table of contentsIntroductionThe balance of power and the First World WarConclusionIntroductionBefore the 20th century, Britain had opted for a stance of isolationism against other powers in Europe, without formal alliances, this allowed them to maneuver among other nations without being drawn into conflict. Therefore, it once seemed unlikely that Britain would become a player if war broke out across Europe. Yet in the summer of 1914, the British government made the decision to enter the war, and scholars continue to debate why this decision was made more than 100 years after the outbreak of war. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on 'Why violent video games should not be banned'?Get the original essayThe balance of power and the First World WarBritish foreign policy sought to achieve a balance of power across Europe before the World War I, hoping that no one country could dominate the continent. Many believe that by maintaining this balance, war would be avoided by deterring any aggressors. However, the unification of Germany in 1871 upset this balance as the country's economic power proliferated and the foreign policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who wanted to further elevate Germany's position, began to challenge this status quo which has led neighboring countries to protect themselves through alliances. with the Franco-Russian alliance signed in 1894. With this alliance signed, two competing alliance blocs were now formed, with Russia and France on one side and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other . Until the late 1890s, the British government had refused to ally with other nations, opting instead for "splendid isolation". The imperialists claimed that a vast overseas empire and navy would protect Britain; this argument failed after the Boer War exposed the weakness of the British war machine and the problems this posed for the British Empire. With the formation of the alliances mentioned, the British government now realized that Britain found itself isolated, with a small army and no friendly alliances. Before 1906, Russia was considered the most significant threat. So, in weighing the options, the British government had to consider the threat of a victorious Russia with an ally of France in a potential war. Britain was looking for an ally without excessive commitments. With Anglo-German tensions rising, Britain began to turn towards its old enemy, France, and the Entente Cordiale was signed in 1904, but it did not involve formal military obligation. Sir Edward Gray had feared that by transforming the Entente into a formal alliance it would have given France and Russia the initiative to declare war. This can therefore be seen as a careful diplomatic balance aimed at restraining both countries while deterring Germany. A balance of power between the two alliance blocs should in theory strengthen deterrence, as neither side can hope for a clear victory. However, the problem was that both sides could envisage victory, prompting them to want to act before the scales tipped in their favor. Steiner and Neilson, in their book "Britain and the Origins of the First World War", argued that if Germany did indeed intend to tip the balance of power in its favor, without a strong coalition of powers to stop it,victory would be possible. Therefore, although Britain had no military obligation to provide aid to France and Russia, the British government may have come to the conclusion that the only way to maintain the balance of power was to join the war in 1914 to provide additional power against Germany. The British would also rely on these Entente Powers to fight a war on land, as with only a small army compared to other powers in Europe, Britain relied heavily on its naval power to exert its control . Britain felt that the balance of power was even more threatened. with Germany's ambition to expand its naval fleet from 1897. British naval dominance was based on a fleet large enough to withstand any threat from two combined European powers. Germany already had the largest military force, but Britain believed that the combined powers of Russia and France could counterbalance this, thus deterring Germany from conflict and maintaining the status quo throughout the world. 'Europe. With a growing naval fleet, the balance would tip in Germany's favor, increasing fears about Britain's position as a world power and threatening its domestic defense. The British government understood that the only adequate response to the naval plan was to participate in a naval arms race to maintain balance and protect itself. This competition further worsened Anglo-German relations. Attempts were made to reestablish ties between the two countries in 1912 with the Haldane Mission Enterprise; the hope was to end the naval arms race. The German government agreed to stop shipbuilding under the conditions of British neutrality in the event of a European conflict. For the British government, this was too great a concession because its maritime supremacy was intended to intervene against disturbances in the balance of power. The failure to reach a deal only worsened relations and helped develop Germany's image as a threat to Britain's global position. There was growing concern that Germany would seek to dominate Europe, much like Napoleon did in the early 19th century, and that achieving this dominance would allow it to outcompete the British navy and use continental ports, which which would lead to domination of the seas. So we can see a clear connection. between Britain's naval power and the government's desire to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Until early August, the British cabinet was divided over how to handle the unfolding crisis in Europe, with many believing that Britain should remain neutral. Between 30 July and 2 August, Liberal MP Charles Honhouse highlighted the many opposing views within Parliament, stating that "the Prime Minister, Haldane and myself are in favor of war if there were no -what a simple technical violation of the Belgian treaty". Unlike the alliances with France and Russia, Britain had military obligations under the 1839 treaty with Belgium, which guaranteed its neutrality. Germany felt trapped between France and Russia and facing a two-front war was its greatest concern; it was decided that the best way to achieve a quick victory against France would be through Belgium. As Margaret Macmillan pointed out in "The War That Ended the Peace", the move would not only damage Germany's reputation, but also threaten to drag Britain.